The Mine Action Express…
or the Wreck of the ‘09

accepting national ownership. The United Nations, United States,
European Union and other donors and advisers would like to hop
off the engine, but often they are alone in the cab and cannot take
the risk of leaving the engine unattended.

Mainstreaming
If mine action is a viable and valid
humanitarian endeavor, fit for intensive global efforts, it is because it is
tied to the concepts of development,
The author discusses current challenges relating to an effective global mineinfrastructure, stability, confidence
and security. In other words, the individual tragedies of landmine acciaction strategy; he considers approaches and policies that could enhance
dents, while emotionally compelling,
pale in numerical comparison to
or impede demining efforts worldwide. There are many emerging concepts
other threats (AIDS, malnutrition,
factional violence, motor vehicle
accidents, etc.) which individually
to consider in order to improve mine action, such as mainstreaming, risk
claim far greater numbers of victims
than landmines.
management and national ownership. The author discusses potential future
Landmine action, therefore,
should be given priority consideration among other national proplans of action the community must undertake regarding these issues in
grams, to the extent that it supports
socioeconomic development. Ah,
order to deal effectively with landmines and explosive remnants of war.
but the rub comes when trying to
disengage the highly successful
mine-action juggernaut, which has
carved out such a huge niche in    
defining its role among donors, nongovernmental organizations, diploby Dennis Barlow [ Mine Action Information Center ]
mats, journalists, governments and
a worldwide public following, and
fit it into a larger and less discrete
n the 20th century, railroad lines became famous for highly
Effective national ownership imdevelopment program. Many in the
efficient, progressive and dependable travel—or for dramatic
plies a string of interrelated condimine-action community are afraid
accidents, which epitomized the height of negligence and bad
tions. It suggests a strong national
to turn the throttle over to develplanning. Whether these railroad events are agonizing or amazing,
will; an integrated set of governopment officials and move toward
the images and emotions they evoke—similar to mine-action acciment agencies; the ability to recogthe back of the train, out of sight of
nize, build and maintain capacities;
dents or accomplishments—are indelibly etched into our minds.
the engine, gauges and view ahead.
At the Mine Action Information Center, it seems to us that the
and a skill and willingness to enTheir motives may range from the
rapidly developing state of mine action has reached the point where
gage the populace. These characMine action needs to get its train on track by seriously addressing issues like national ownership,
altruistic to the purely selfish, but
it can, like great and majestic train lines, combine the best of many
teristics have proven difficult for
       development, and common goals in order to avoid disastrous consequences.
their concerns are real nevertheless.
technologies and innovations to provide effective and secure sercountries emerging from crisis situPUBLIC DOMAIN PHOTO
Development plans and officials
ations. Therefore, the mine-action
vice—or it can force together conflicting strategies and mechanisms
are not always enamored with or
to cause its own “great train wreck.”
community has bit-by-bit crafted an
cognizant of the complexities of mine action, nor are donors necesOver the past year, some of the best practitioners, policymakers
informal set of global support networks available to the landminesarily eager to pledge funds to support activities other than those
and pundits involved in mine action have developed some thoughtimpacted countries. Donor states, the United Nations, major nonspecifically earmarked for mine-action projects. It remains for those
provoking and timely concepts that should be considered for integragovernmental organizations, regional organizations and corporain the global community to foster vehicles such as the Millennium
tions have formed a complex network of interrelated activities to
tion into mine-action campaigns. I will discuss a few of those ideas
Development Goals² to provide settings that will promote an envihere, not only with a view to their validity as specific ideas, but also
help these countries. But the concept of building national inderonment of trust and comfort in which mine-action activities can be
more with an eye to integrating them into a total system that will
pendence from without—that is, by external forces—is touchy at
integrated with other projects and programs.
yield the greatest overall efficiencies.
best. National ownership implies sovereignty and independence;
yet foreign technical advisors, donor representatives, U.N. field
Landmines and Other Explosive Remnants of War³
workers, guest militaries and diplomats are often inserted into
National Ownership
To achieve any end, we must first determine what is impeding our
the process, sometimes ironically clouding the issue of national
While sustainability of nationally owned mine-action programs
way. The great railroad planners were able to scout ahead and surindependence even while striving mightily to help develop strong
seems to be a universal goal, it is becoming evident that it is an
mise the challenges that terrain, indigenous populations and climate
national capabilities.
elusive condition. Studies by Mssrs. Kjellman and Harppviken of
would pose. In the area of mine action, we were forced to add more
The above situation is the best-case scenario. Reports at both
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)1 and others sugand more threats to the initial concerns that began with the singular
the most recent International Meeting of Mine Action Programme
gest it is not just the non-functioning state that finds national ownertask of finding anti-personnel landmines.
Directors and U.N. Advisors in July and Ottawa Convention
ship difficult to achieve. In spite of the positive connotations of the
We realized that battlefield clutter also usually contained unexStates Parties Meeting in September suggest a significant number
term, there are murky and even conflicting implications just below
ploded ordnance. Then we had to accept that caches of ammunition,
of impacted governments are just “not there” when it comes to
the surface.
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small arms and light weapons, booby traps, and improvised explosive
devices could each be part of a post-conflict environment. While the
Ottawa Convention4 is concerned solely with APLs, countries at risk
have had to deal realistically with all potential explosive remnants
of war. The landmine strategy has been successful, but it still needs
to address the question of the growing threat of other ERW.
Some, such as Tim Carstairs of Mines Advisory Group, argue
that the mixed weapon consideration must be taken into account
and that donors and policy makers must be made to understand the
concept that landmines, small arms and light weapons, UXO, etc.,
must be considered and planned together in order to assure that
the land is indeed safe and preparation for subsequent development
is assured.
The good news is that many organizations, such as the
European Commission, the   U.N.   Mine Action Service and the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining have
taken the pragmatic step of including broader ERW considerations
into mandates to support mine action, and some countries such
as Cambodia have adopted a holistic approach to post-conflict
ERW threats. The bad news is that international policy must deal
separately with APLs and ERW as defined by the Ottawa Convention
and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.5
Release of Land
When humanitarian demining was beginning as a new movement, it developed an admirable method for trying to identify mined         
areas—which after all, is the precursor to dealing with the landmine
threat. Impact surveys were instituted in most countries at risk from
APLs. Based on these surveys, suspected mined areas were identified. Predictably, in an effort not to pass over contaminated areas,
many more suspected mine areas were identified than in reality were
seeded with mines. It now appears that upwards of 90 percent of
operators’ time and resources are being spent in areas where there
are no mines.6
It will require imagination and courage to deal with this situation, but the cold, hard fact is massive quantities of usable land are
declared out of bounds, which is a major factor keeping developing
countries from expanding education, trade, agriculture and other
development. Per Nergaard of Norwegian People’s Aid suggests
identifying and releasing the wrongly identified land will require
considering such ideas as tolerable risk, implementing new and improved techniques of information gathering and management, and reclassifying land under review, immediately placing land declared
“released” from threat into productive use. Nergaard recommends
greater use of technical research and geographic information systems
polygon-control measures to take some of the guesswork out of release. He accepts the fact that liability, risk and standards will come
into play but insists these are concepts that simply have to be faced.
Others will not accept such an interpretation because they believe
that tolerable risk conflicts with a perceived “mine-free” scenario
called for by the Ottawa Convention.6
More consideration of these concepts, especially the various aspects of risk management and risk tolerance, is being undertaken by
Havard Bach and Tim Lardner of the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining, and we eagerly anticipate their further research.
Mine-free; Impact-free
Perhaps the most basic prerequisite to having a safe and effective
railroad journey is fixing a definite schedule and timetable. While
it is laughable to think of boarding a train without either passenger or engineer aware of its destination, this is the plight that many
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mine-action managers find themselves faced
with today. In the simplest of all strategy
formulas, we ask “Where are we? Where do
we want to go? How do we get there?” If we
do not know where we want to go, no effective strategy can be planned, and we will
surely never reach our goal.

Many signatories have emphasized their
position at each of the seven Convention
Review Conferences that “impact free” just
does not measure up to the specific requirements of Article 5. However, the European
Community’s policy “is to drastically reduce
the lingering threat and impact of land-

The mine-action train can be efficient and effective with better cooperation and confluence within the community.
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There are various guideposts for
global mine action, but none so universally applied as the requirements of the
Ottawa Convention. Article 5 (Clearance)
of that document appears to be unambiguous: “Each State Party undertakes to
destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines.”4 Thus the Convention
seems to call for what some (such as the
Landmine Monitor) define as a “mine free”
world. And yet the very first words of the
Convention imply that the reason for the
formal agreement is that the States Parties
are “Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties.”4 This suggests the reason for implementing the Convention was
to alleviate the practical threat of landmines.
Some have taken that position under the rubric of “impact free.” Sara Sekkenes of the
United Nations Development Programme
points out that neither term—mine-free nor
impact-free—is found in the Convention.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find
champions for each point of view. Richard
Kidd of the U.S. Department of State provides a sharp and succinct explanation of
why he believes that a “mine free” global
endstate is impractical: “No donor, lending
institution and no major impacted country
has indicated a willingness to put up the
huge amounts of resources required to find
and clear every last mine.” 7   
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mines.”8 It has therefore articulated a “zerovictim target.” In a situation in which many
nations at risk receive support and advice
from many different quarters, they are often
given conflicting or nebulous guidance.
What is clear is that the differences
among the approaches will be vast. Clearing
all landmines from all affected countries
by 2009 or 2010 will not only be daunting but resource-intensive. Just as in curing
any social ill (pollution, extreme poverty,
HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, unemployment,
etc.), erasing the very last vestiges of the
threat often requires the largest application
of resources. This comes at a time when there
are indications that donor funding will become more difficult to obtain. Alistair Craib
of the United Kingdom gave a sobering
discussion of this trend at the Mine Action
Directors Meeting in July 2006.9
We at the MAIC further note that only
12 countries are on a pace to complete their
Article 5 requirements by 2009. This alone
suggests that the absolute position of Article
5 may be unrealistic. If Belgium is not
ready to declare itself free of all landmines,
how can we expect that Laos, Cambodia,
Mozambique and the many other impacted
countries will be able to do so within the
specified time period?
A clear and compelling explanation of
the ramifications of the decisions of a mine-

action program is set out in Bob Keeley’s article, “Are We Setting the Wrong Target?”10
After reaching the conclusion that the literal
application of Article 5 would be impractical,
he makes a logical assumption that an endstate should be defined as being “the point
where there is no economic demand for the
land left uncleared and where all reasonable
and practicable steps have also been taken to
prevent casualties in the areas that remain
contaminated.” Keeley implores us to have
the courage to face this issue head on and
modify Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention.
Whither the Mine-Action Express?
Never before in the short history of mine
action have there been so many emerging
ideas and opportunities for improvements
and enhancements to mine action. But neither have there been so many distractions
and competing ideas. There is no authoritative monolith to make these decisions for
us. Just as we have had to build mine action through coordinated and sometimes
informal actions in the past, we will have to
achieve consensus in the future. Selecting,
combining, designing and engineering the
way ahead will be difficult—and probably
painful. The goal is to stay calm, stay focused, and construct an engine that will
operate efficiently and powerfully in dealing
with one of the great pervasive threats of the
21st century: post-crisis recovery.
See Endnotes, page 109
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The Rise of ERW as a Threat to Civilians
In this article, the author looks at the rise of landmines
and ERW1 as military tactics from the First World War
to current conflicts. The safety risk their presence
The methods used in warfare have changed over the years,
causing more threats to civilians, such as these people killed
in Darfur in 2005.
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poses and various measures to protect civilians are
also discussed.

by Lt. Colonel Mohamed Taghioullah Ould Nema [ Mauritania National Demining Office ]

S

ince the beginning of the 20th century, the world has witnessed
several destructive and deadly wars. Two of the most horrific
were the First and Second World Wars, during which explosives,
engines, rockets and shells were used widely. Many people died and
large amounts of property were destroyed. Of great concern is that
a significant number of people continue to be at risk due to the existence of thousands of explosive remnants of war, including landmines,
resulting from these and other conflicts.
To some degree, landmines are losing their importance in the face
of the new trends in military tactics, as can be observed in the recent massive military campaigns in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Lebanon, for example. These conflicts have essentially been led as air
strikes rather than ground attacks. This change in tactics produces a
complicated situation in which children and other innocent civilians
increasingly have to deal with a large quantity of unexploded debris
(missiles, shells, rockets, bombs, engines) right in their own communities and homes. This new environment of the battlefield contributes
to worsening significantly the living situation for civilians—buildings
and bridges are destroyed; many fires spread due to the presence of incendiary ammunition and explosions or flames; broken iron and glass
litter communities; people suffer a loss of electricity due to the destruction of electric power stations; etc.
Consequently, civilian protection during a conflict nowadays should
be the most important activity in the mine-action process. Otherwise,
the most vulnerable civilians may be severely injured or killed simply
because they find themselves near military targets during air strikes,
and later because of the potentially huge and unfortunate ERW risks
that will be difficult to overcome following the conflict.
The two World Wars gave landmines an important tactical role.
The combination of tank and air strikes was a crucial strategic principle for success during these wars. At the same time, in order to protect
one’s own position from the infantry’s attack or an armoured assault,
the strategy was often to use landmines and create minefields. Mines
were used as an efficient way to harass the enemy, defend one’s own
location, cover one’s troops from attackers and reinforce one’s military
equipment. They were an important component of the tactical manoeuvre used that included artillery strikes, aircraft hits, and armoured
and infantry actions.

As time went on, the effectiveness of tanks and new weapons lessened the need for minefields as a solution against armoured attacks.
For instance, during World War II the Italian, British and German
forces all laid mountains of landmines in northern Africa, but the
mines weren’t as effective as in the past because the tanks used by the
military could roll right over them without being affected. Because so
many mines were emplaced, huge quantities of landmines and ERW
remain today.
Increased Use of Missiles and Ordnance in the Gulf Wars
On 15 January 1991, U.N. Coalition Forces started air raids on
Iraq, but the ground attack did not begin until 24 February. This situation reflects how the previously important role of the tank in warfare
has lessened and how mines as well have lost some of their value as a
weapon in armed conflict. With battle tactics shifting to the air with
such warplanes as the F-1172 and B-523 and other aerial vectors that
drop immense quantities of bombs and rockets on the enemy, the battleground has changed. Increasingly sophisticated weaponry, such as
the Patriot missile,4 and other means of aerial attack and defence were
used in the first Gulf War and since to gain a strategic advantage. The
resulting destruction from these tactics is systematic, leading to massive collateral damage on the ground.
The tactics of modern warfare have continued to involve more
ERW than mines, as seen in the March 2003 invasion of Baghdad,
Iraq, during which Coalition Forces dropped munitions from the air
in large quantities. As a result, the incidence of ERW has grown significantly, while the use of landmines is decreasing. In addition, Iraq has
seen a large increase in the use of improvised bombs, missiles and other explosive devices by non-state actors, leading again to an increased
threat of harm from ERW.
As a result, ERW—instead of mines—are now the biggest threat to
civilians; indeed, this shift in warfare highlights the need for a new approach to mine action in order to deal with the very real consequences
of ERW for civilians in the aftermath of war.
Case in Point: Recent Conflict in Lebanon
The 34-day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon that
ended 14 August 2006, involved a deployment of explosive weapons
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